



I. The "Matter of International Concern" Discussion
A. The Treaty Power of the National Government is Plenary, But Does
Not Extend Beyond the Proper Subject Matter of Treaties.
Discussion in the United States of a subject-matter limitation on the
power of the national government to make treaties has centered on whether
the subject is a "matter of international concern." The phrase comes from
remarks by Charles Evans Hughes at the 1929 annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law. Hughes was presiding at a session
on the treaty power at which the principal speaker was Charles Henry
Butler, author of THE TREATY POWER OF THE UNITED STATES.
At the end of the discussion, in response to requests from the audience,
Hughes stated his own views on the topic.
In his address, Butler said that in discussions on the treaty power
throughout the 150-year history of the United States two opposing schools
of thought had developed:
One espousing the widest range within which the federal government can
exercise the treaty making power, Federal and State, and the other insisting on
much narrower limits, especially in regard to those matters that are otherwise
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States.'
Butler listed as leaders of the "wide-range school" Chief Justice Mar-
shall, and Supreme Court Justices Story, James Wilson, Iredell, and Miller,
*Nagel Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law, Washington University; grad-
uate Yale Law School (LL.B, J.S.D.); Fellow, American Council of Learned Societies,
1948-50; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1960-6 1.
tThis article is based on an address delivered by Professor Dorsey on June 6, 1969, at an
Institute on the Law of Treaties, co-sponsored by the Division of International Law and
Foreign Trade at the Law Center of the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and the
American Society of International Law. Permission to publish tls article in The International
Lawyer has been granted by the University of Missouri- Kansas City, which will soon publish
the full proceedings.
I1929 Proceedings A. S. I. L. 176-193. Other quotations from Butler are from the same
source. -
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
210 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
as well as Chancellor Kent, and Professors Pomeroy and Cooley. In
opposition, Butler listed John C. Calhoun, John Randolph Tucker and his
son, and Senator Isador Raynor. Butler aligned himself with the
"wide-range school," stating that in his opinion "there are no limitations on
the treaty-making power of the United States as to matters otherwise
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States, and which result from the
sovereign jurisdiction of the States over such matters." He supported this
position by pointing out that the Supreme Court had upheld the exercise of
the treaty power "in regard to matters that are peculiarly sacred as being
under State jurisdiction. Tenure of lands within the States and inheritance
thereof, taxation, existence and collection of debts, licenses, police regu-
lations, protection of game, etc .. " However, Butler did not hold that the
treaty-making power was without limit. He said:
I do not mean to say that there are no limitations whatever on the
treaty-making power of the United States, but I do mean to say that such
limitations as may exist are those which exist as to every sovereignty or which
are imposed by provisions of the Constitution itself some of which necessarily
affect matters within the jurisdiction of the several States, or ... by those
fundamental principles on which this Government is based."
Hughes clearly agreed with Butler that the powers constitutionally re-
served to the States are not a limitation on the treaty-making power.2 His
key statements are as follows:
"It seems to me that, whatever doubt there may originally have been or
may yet linger in some minds in regard to the scope of the treaty-making
power, so far as it relates to the external concerns of the nation there is no
question for discussion. I think it is perfectly idle to consider that the
Supreme Court would ever hold that any treaty made in a constitutional
manner in relation to external concerns of the nation is beyond the power
of the sovereignty of the United States where no express prohibition of the
Constitution has been violated.
"I take the view which I understand to be that of the Supreme Court
that this is a sovereign nation; that the States, in relation to foreign affairs,
are not sovereign States; that if this nation exercises its sovereign power in
regulating by agreement its relations to other nations, it must be done
through the exercise of the treaty-making power and in that relation there
are no states, there is but one country.
"If we take the Constitution to mean what it says, it gives in terms to the
United States the power to make treaties. It is a power that has no explicit
21929 Proceedings A. S. I. L. 194-196. Other quotations from Hughes are from the same
source.
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limitation attached to it, and so far there has been no disposition to find in
anything relating to the external concerns of the nation a limitation to be
implied.
"So I come back to the suggestion I made at the start, that this is a
sovereign nation, from my point of view the nation has the power to make
any agreement whatever in a constitutional manner that relates to the
conduct of our international relations, unless there can be found some
express prohibition in the Constitution, and I am not aware of any which
would in any way detract from the power as I have defined it in connection
with our relations with other governments."
Hughes said that he was unwilling to voice an opinion as to whether,
beyond the limitation of express constitutional prohibitions, there might be
some implied limitation of the treaty-making power. He was willing, how-
ever, to indicate the source from which such implied limitation might arise.
He said:
But if there is a limitation to be implied, I should say it might be found in the
nature of the treaty making power.
What is the power to make a treaty? What is the object of the power? The
normal scope of the power can be found in the appropriate object of the power.
The power is to deal with foreign nations with regard to matters of inter-
national concern. It is not a power intended to be exercised, it may be
assumed, with respect to matters that have no relation to international con-
cerns.
This is the context in which Hughes made the statement that has been
cited in support of the view that the reserved powers of the States are a
constitutional limitation upon the treaty-making power of the national gov-
ernment. The statement was:
But if we attempted to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters
which did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters which
normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States,
then I again say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon the
treaty-making power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made
relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United
States in their internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted
treaty-making power.
As an example of the kind of activity which might cause the Supreme
Court to find the kind of limitation he was suggesting, Hughes referred to
recent international negotiations on matters of private international law.
Hughes felt that the United States delegation was correct in not participat-
ing in the negotiations because, although many matters considered were
"not entirely of local concern," there would be some matters "which were
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exclusively within the local jurisdiction, which had no international relation
at all except in the desire to get rid of a conflict of doctrine or a conflict of
law and to establish a uniform law." The resulting treaty would have
"attempted to superimpose upon the States which under our system had
control of a great number of these subjects, the will of the Federal Govern-
ment as expressed in a treaty made by it with other governments..." In
deciding whether a subject matter was sufficiently of international concern
to justify exercise of the treaty-making power, Hughes was ready to apply
the same supremacy doctrine that had been developed with respect to the
interstate commerce power in matters of intermingled local and national
concern. He said:
I imagine that the same doctrine would be sustained in regard to the
treaty-making power where concerns, which perhaps under former conditions
had been entirely local, had become so related to international matters that an
international regulation could not appropriately succeed without embracing the
local affairs as well.
Taking Hughes' remarks as a whole, it must be acknowledged that he
does not take the position that a subject-matter limitation on the treaty
power is to be found in the United States Constitution's reservation of
powers to the States, and he does not indicate any provision of the Con-
stitution that would provide the substance for such a limitation.3 On the
other hand, it must be acknowledged that Hughes does suggest that a
subject-matter limitation might need to be enunciated in the light of some
kinds of treaty negotiations. Was Hughes, formerly Secretary of State,
currently President of the American Society of International Law, and
soon to be Chief Justice, making ill-informed extemporaneous remarks, or
is there constitutional substance for a subject-matter limitation on the
treaty power?
B. Constitutional Incorporation of International Limitations on the Proper
Subject Matter of Treaties.
It is suggested that the Hughes' position, which this author believes to
be correct, is that the United States Constitution incorporates inter-
national-law limitations on the subject matter of treaties because "treaty
power" is to be defined by reference to its context. This position was
implicit in Hughes' remarks, when he said that if a limitation were to be
implied it might be found in "the nature of the treaty making power."
Hughes continued: "What is the power to make a treaty? What is the
3The Hughes suggestion of a 'matter of international concern" limitation on the
treaty-making power has been widely accepted in the United States and is codified in Rest.
FOR REL. LAW § 17 (1) (a).
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object of the power? The normal scope of the power can be found in the
appropriate object of the power. The power is to deal with foreign nations
with regard to matters of international concern."
This reasoning does not parse the Constitution for the treaty-making
power of the United States government. It draws on fundamental prin-
ciples of the international community to determine the nature of the
treaty-making power of any sovereign state. Understood in this way, the
"international concern" limitation falls within one of the recognized cate-
gories of treaty-power limitations listed by Butler in his principal address at
that 1929 session, namely, "those which exist as to every sovereignty."
International law, of course, does not include a written, legally en-
forceable, constitution. Therefore, it is not possible to point to a specific
rule of international law prohibiting states from making treaties on certain
subject matters. But precisely because of its decentralized nature, inter-
national law achieves a measure of effectiveness only if it adheres closely
to the realities of interestate activities, expectations, and accepted ordering
principles. Any subject-matter limitation on the treaty power is to be found
in these realities, and the sanction for breach of such limitations is the sure
disaster that will follow from relying on illusion for the protection of
national interests. Let us essay the expression of a principle embodying
this view, and see where it carries us:
If expecting cooperative or reciprocal actions of states or effective sanctions
is unrealistic, the subject matter is not appropriate for a treaty.
The Hughes' category of "entirely internal matters" would be one type
of inappropriate subject matter under this principle of realistic ex-
pectations. Some of the reasons why Hughes was correct are discussed
hereunder. Further, it is suggested that under the same principle, "general
and abstract matters" are another type of subject matter inappropriate for
treaties.
II. The "Internal Matters" Limitation
The first reality to be considered, in determining whether a matter is
internal or external, is the purpose of state action. Considerat'on can then
be given to such questions as whether nationals of more than one state are
significantly affected, where specific actions will occur, whether the inter-
ests of all states concerned are identical, or compatible, and what sanctions
are likely to be imposed. Under headings of different purposes of state
action, there are sketched hereunder very broadly some of the devel-
opments in the interactions of states that bear significantly on the issue of
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whether expecting cooperative or reciprocal actions or effective sanctions
is sufficiently realistic for a treaty concerning the subject to be appropriate.
A. Protection of Life and Property.
Territorial sovereignty was accepted in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
At that time, the predominant purpose of state action in western Europe
was to protect life and property. The basic ordering principle of territorial
sovereignty means that authority to protect life and property was dis-
tributed in accordance with demonstrated physical power to take and hold
territory. 4 Any exercise of governing authority by one state within the
territory of another was an extremely serious matter because, in light of the
central importance of territorial sovereignty, it could only be interpreted as
a deliberate challenge to the existence and integrity of the injured state.
The distinction between internal and external affairs was basic indeed to
international law. With minimal exceptions, how a state treated its own
nationals within its own territory was of no concern to any other state.
Whether a state, within its territory, accorded the nationals of another state
a minimum standard of protection of life and property was an external
matter because each member of the international community accepted this
obligation as an implication of territorial sovereignty. A large body of state
practice and international adjudication has grown out of the application of
this principle of state responsibility.
Innumerable treaties, usually bilateral, have spelled out more specifically
the rights of signatories' nationals within each other's territory. Typical
content can be found in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the
United States of America and His Most Christian Majesty (of France) of
February 6, 1778, signed for the United States by B. Franklin, Silas Deane
and Arthur Lee, 5 and its subsequent replacement of September 30, 1800,
the Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of
America, ratified for France by Bonaparte, Talleyrand and Hugues B.
Maret.6 Citizens of either country are to be at liberty to devise their
property within the territory of the other, and to have the right to take, to
give, or to devise such property without naturalization. This exempts
covered aliens from the droit d'aubaine and the droit de dtraction, quite
common at the time in Western Europe, under which an alien's property
was confiscated upon death, and an alien taking by inheritance was charged
a duty. Further, the citizens of each are to enjoy in the territory of the
4See DORSEY & SHUMAN, VALIDATION OF NEW FORMS OF SOCIAl ORGANIZATION 3-1I,
Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1968.
-8 Stat. 12.
68 Stat. 178.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
Subject-Matter Limitations on Treaty Power
other the "same privileges and immunities, as well for their property and
persons, as for what concerns trade, navigation and commerce" as are
enjoyed by citizens of the most favored nation.
Expecting reciprocal actions by signatory states to make alien treaty
rights effective was realistic. If a state was barred by territorial sovereignty
from sending its own armed guards to protect its nationals within the
territory of another state, it was necessary for each state to accept the
obligation to protect aliens within its borders. Reciprocity of advantage
created a common interest. If the United States wanted its nationals to be
free of inheritance tax in France it had to refrain from levying inheritance
tax on French nationals in this country. Remedy for breach was simple and
effective. If France, in violation of the treaty, imposed an inheritance tax
on United States nationals in France, the United States could impose the
same tax on French nationals in the United States.
Beginning with the treaties in the Peace of Westphalia, treaty provisions
were entered into requiring states to accord within their own territories
certain protections to their own nationals who were members of religious
minorities. Against the then recent background of religious wars following
the Reformation, the subject-matter was appropriate for exercise of the
treaty power. It had many times been demonstrated that states were willing
to apply the sanction of war to protect the rights of co-religionists in other
states.
But there is a decided absence of similarity and proportionality of war as
a response to persecution of a domestic minority. There is neither the
reciprocity of advantage in honoring the treaty obligation, nor the possi-
bility for reciprocity of disadvantage as a sanction for breach, as in the case
of alien-protection treaties. Provisions for the protection of the rights of
domestic religious, ethnic and political minorities were included in peace
treaties following World War I and World War 11, but in the light of
geopolitical realities, it is difficult to believe that they were prompted by
genuine expectations of effective sanctions rather than being merely a
fagade of continuing concern to cover the fact of abandonment.
B. Economic Welfare of Nationals Doing Business Abroad.
In recent decades, non-communist states have sought to establish a
network of treaty obligations that will develop international trade opportu-
nities for their nationals. The bilateral treaties of friendship and commerce
essentially established the conditions on which nationals could enter and
do business in other countries. The newer multilateral trade agreements
result from state action to foster profitable international commerce. A
prime example is the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade, which is
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extremely bulky and detailed, and is revised from time to time on the basis
of negotiations. In the United States, a complex system of broadly repre-
sentative committees and public hearings has been established to discover
the interests and desires of all segments of the economy as a basis for
participating in GATT negotiations.
Modern trade and commerce treaties are mutually advantageous. If they
were not, they would not be entered into. Clearly it is realistic to expect
reciprocal or cooperative actions of states to make them effective.
C. Scientific Research
This is an appropriate subject matter for treaties because, unlike activi-
ties such as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, exclusive control of
large areas is not required. If the Antarctic promised to yield valuable fuels
or minerals, states would press territorial claims to the fullest. When it is
the site and subject of scientific study, a multilateral treaty putting all
territorial claims in abeyance and permitting free and open access to the
Antarctic is realistic. The scientific purpose of activity in space, and to
some extent with respect to weather-significant aspects of the earth's
atmosphere, make open access and cooperation treaties realistic with re-
spect to these environments.
D. International Stability and Peace
1. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Many bilateral and multilateral treaties cover the interstate relationships
of providing technical and financial aid to developing nations. The Alliance
for Progress spells out most specifically and comprehensively the receiving
country's reciprocal obligation to take measures that will assure satisfac-
tory economic and social development. Building roads, dams, power plants
and schools, providing farm credit, fertilizer and improved seed strains,
redistributing land, establishing a fair and effective tax system, are all
matters that Hughes in 1929 doubtless would have said, with general
agreement, are of "entirely local" concern and therefore not appropriate
subject-matters for treaties.
According to the stated rationale of the development assistance treaties,
roads, schools, power resources, farm credit and tax systems, etc., have
become external matters. The stated purpose is to establish stability and
peace in a region, international cooperation is deemed necessary to accom-
plish the social and economic justice from which stability and peace will
flow. The realism of expecting effective interstate cooperative action on
such matters is more difficult to determine. Interstate assistance is needed;
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there is some willingness to give as well as some willingness to take for the
genuine development purpose. Where bona fide development intent of
giving and receiving states controls, all that stands in the way of effective
cooperation is differences of opinion on social and economic justice; past
misunderstandings and suspicions; political vagaries in giving and receiving
states; staggering shortages of essential skills in the receiving country; the
immensity of the task and the impatience of the deprived; and the idiosyn-
crasies of key personnel in giving and receiving states.
When genuine development purpose does not control, the problem is
more difficult. For instance, if a giving state has, as one of its purposes,
securing the military opposition of the controlling r6gime of the receiving
state to revolutionary social change, and the r6gime is composed of land
owners and generals who have as one of their purposes building personal
Swiss bank accounts, a development treaty is likely to be unrealistic. The
influence of the principle of territorial sovereignty is still so deep, pervasive
and unquestioned that the r6gime in a developing country which wants to
take the aid but avoid the changes incident to sound and just development,
has only to cry "foreign intervention in internal affairs" to rally over-
whelming regional and world public opinion in favor of its resistance to any
pressure from the giving country. The giving state, then, will find that it has
no effective sanctions to assure the flow of a substantial part of assistance
capital into meaningful development projects in the receiving country.
International cooperative action or effective sanctions to build schools,
roads, dams, etc., in a developing country is likely to be effective only
when all signatory states have a genuine development purpose which
predominates over all other purposes, or when development needs happen
to be served by actions taken in pursuit of other purposes. This would
indicate that, by the test of realism, the previously internal matters of
education, transportation, power resources, etc., have become external
only to a marginal extent.
2. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The current debate over subject-matter limitations on the treaty-making
power arises with respect to the issue of whether the United States should
adhere to "human rights" treaties. The human rights covenants resulting
from the United Nations drafting process, and other treaties covering the
same subject matter less comprehensively, include political, economic and
social rights.
Proponents of United States adherence to the human rights treaties do
not really argue that the rights of Americans to vote, work and be served in
a restaurant are external matters. Instead, they finesse the issue. The
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argument runs: International stability and peace can be achieved only if
basic human rights are protected throughout the world; the United States
depends for its secure and peaceful future upon the success of the program
to achieve worldwide protection of human rights; the United States cannot
expect other countries to accept the legal obligations to protect the human
rights defined in the treaties if the United States is unwilling to assume the
same obligation.
Let us begin by accepting arguendo the premise that political, economic
and social justice will foster international stability and peace. The first
question is whether acceptance by states of the legal obligation to protect
the human rights defined in the current treaties would produce political,
economic and social justice. Many of the rights in these treaties are stated
in absolute, utopian terms. For instance, Art. 7(d) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recites that the parties
recognize the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work which ensure, in particular: ... (d) Rest, leisure and
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as
well as remuneration for public holidays."
In very few countries of the world are the economic means adequate to
that end. In most countries for a long time, it will be meaningless to
measure the justice of the national economy by whether it meets a list of
such absolute goals. The only meaningful standard will be the fairness of
the distribution of rewards and deprivation in an economy of continuing
scarcity. And "fairness" will necessarily and rightly carry elements of
history, culture and ideology. National efforts to move toward affluence
will have a reasonable chance of success only if the people accept and
work within the actual possibilities of their own situations. Will it foster
stability and peace for the international community to encourage people,
whose only real hope is a just distribution of scarcity to expect and demand
the implementation of absolute and utopian rights?
But assuming, again arguendo, that protection of the treaty-defined hu-
man rights will foster stability and peace, the question remains whether
treaties which obligate both developed and developing countries with re-
spect to the political, economic and social rights of their nationals inter se
within their own territories will assist the movement toward protection of
such human rights within developing countries. What are the prospects for
effective cooperation, reciprocity or sanctions? This is not a situation in
which the United States and Peru agree that neither will tax the other's
nationals within its territory. If it were and the United States taxed Per-
uvians in America, Peru could bring effective pressure to bear by taxing
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Americans in Peru. There would be reciprocity of advantage and of dis-
advantage. But if the treaty requires paid holidays to be granted by Per-
uvians to Peruvians in Peru, and by Americans to Americans in the United
States, and Peru breaches, will it be moved to mend its ways if the United
States sends a note saying: "Look, our citizens grant paid holidays to our
citizens in our country." How will that pinch Peru?
Or is the reciprocity to be of a different sort: Since the right of Peruvian
workers in Peru to have paid holidays is to be an international matter, the
right of American workers in the United States and the right of Soviet
workers in the Soviet Union to have paid holidays should also be an
international matter? Such a reciprocity is patently unrealistic.
The deep and pervasive continuing acceptance of the principle of territo-
rial sovereignty enables developing states to accept international assistance
for internal economic and social development and then, by invoking "inter-
vention," vitiate any international participation in decisions about internal
utilization. It is unrealistic to expect developed states that have greater
power and who are not in the position of needing economic assistance to
rely any less upon the exclusionary aspect of territorial sovereignty.
Of course, it is precisely the sovereign po\ er of states that proponents
of the human rights treaties wish to see limited in such a way that states
will not have the power to abridge human rights, upset stability and threat-
en peace. Unfortunately, the abridging, upsetting and threatening sovereign
power is also the only effective power in the world today to protect human
rights, establish stability and preserve peace. What is offered as an alterna-
tive organization of power to meet human needs? According to what
principle would the authority to make decisions and use power be dis-
tributed? What are the social conditions to which the new polity would
respond more realistically than does the international community of territo-
rially sovereign states? What reason is there to believe that the proposed
new principle of distribution of authority would loosen and replace the grip
on the mind of the idea of territorial sovereignty, as, in its time, territorial
sovereignty dispelled and replaced the medieval idea of a universal polity
of Christendom?
The fact is that no new and more effective political organization of
mankind is proposed. The United Nations Charter sets out the purposes of
cooperative action for peace and the protection of human rights in Article
1. But in Article 2, territorial sovereignty is retained as the basic ordering
principle of the international community:
"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
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"1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members." (Emphasis added.) 7
It is unrealistic to expect developed states, which are relatively free from
the pressure of economic necessity, to accept international participation in
decisions concerning the political, economic and social rights of their
nationals inter se within their own territories. Therefore, the adherence of
developed states to the current human rights treaties would be tinged with
the hypocritical intent to interfere abroad without permitting any inter-
ference at home. Since the hypocrisy would be evident, it is unrealistic to
expect that developing states would thereby be moved to any greater
compliance with international standards of protection of human rights.
By the test of realism, therefore, the previously internal matters of the
political, economic, and social rights of nationals of developed states inter
se within their own territories remain entirely internal, and are not appro-
priate subjects for exercise of the treaty power.
III. The "General and Abstract Matters" Limitation
Proponents of the human rights treaties might well take exception to the
conclusion that in the absence of a feasible alternative to territorial dis-
tribution of authority to protect human rights, it is unrealistic to expect
developed states to open previously internal matters of political, economic
and social rights to international cooperative or reciprocal actions. They
might point out the danger in the atomic age of unlimited national authority
to use force and argue that the human rights treaties require mutual accept-
ance of limitations on the sovereignty of states for the purpose of mutual
survival, and that such limitations do not contradict the basic principle of
territorial sovereignty or threaten to hamper the effective functioning of
territorial states.
Whether it is realistic to expect states to lay aside fears of a total
challenge to territorial sovereignty and reciprocally limit the internal ex-
ercise of sovereignty depends to a very considerable extent upon the
degree to which states can know in advance the scope of any such treaty
obligation. In the case of individuals an obligation can be defined by the
7Other paragraphs of Article 2 set out the obligations of Member states deemed neces-
sary for the success of the United Nations Organization, but none of these contradicts the
o.ganizing principle of sovereign equality of territorial states. Indeed, two of the succeeding
paragraphs contain applications of that principle. Paragraph 4 requires Member states to
refrain from the threat or use of force 'against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state.' Paragraph 7 states that nothing in the Charter authorizes the United Nations to
intervene 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,' or
requires Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter, saving only peace
enforcement measures under the almost entirely vitiated Chapter VII.
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common understanding of the community embodied in law, or in customs
and practices in the light of which courts construe the acts and statements
of the parties.
In the international community, no effectively operating legislative and
judicial processes exist which can reduce general and abstract obligations
to specific and concrete ones in accordance with shared perspectives of
interest, history, culture and ideology. Internationally, differences of inter-
est, history, culture and ideology prevent the consent of states to effective
legislative and judicial processes. Therefore, it is much more important for
states to know in advance the precise and specific scope of any obligations
being assumed, so that relative advantages and disadvantages can be calcu-
lated.
The way for states to achieve the necessary foreseeability is to make all
treaty obligations specific and concrete. If this is not done, each state is in
the position of deducing from the general and abstract statements, on the
basis of its own perspectives of interest, history, culture and ideology, the
obligations of other states and possibly enforcing in its own courts the
obligations as unilaterally interpreted. The perniciousness of such a course,
even when pursued in a good cause is illustrated by opinions of Justice
Story and Chief Justice Marshall in two cases in United States courts that
turned on the question of whether international law prohibited the slave
trade.
In 1822, while on circuit, Justice Story decided the case of La Jeune
Eug~nie, in Massachusetts. 2 Mason 409, 26 Fed. Cases 832. In 1825, the
Supreme Court decided The Antelope, and Marshall wrote the principal
opinion. 10 Wheaton 66. The Jeune Eug6nie was seized by Americans off
the coast of Africa on suspicion of violation of United States laws prohibit-
ing slaving by vessels owned or operated by Americans. The court found
that the vessel was not owned or operated by Americans, and therefore,
although clearly engaged in the slave trade, was not in violation of United
States laws. A claim was then made by the French owners to have the ship
restored to them. This Story refused to do on the ground that the slave
trade was in violation of international law.
Marshall reached the opposite conclusion in The Antelope, in which the
return of slaves to their Spanish owners or their release as free men turned
on whether The Antelope, which had not violated any United States laws,
had violated international law. Story reasoned: The slave trade is contrary
to the moral law and the law of nature; Everything that can be deduced
from a basic principle of moral and natural law is a rule of international
law; A rule of international law is put temporarily in abeyance by a
universal custom to the contrary, but is not extinguished; as soon as two
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states recede from the custom, the rule is again in force between them.
Therefore, despite the absence of any treaty between France and the
United States establishing for them a rule prohibiting the slave trade, and
despite the fact that until recently all states had allowed their ships to
engage in the slave trade, Story found that slave trading was prohibited by
international law.
Marshall, on the other hand, reasoned in this way: The slave trade is
contrary to the moral law and the law of nature; but only the consent of
states can create a rule of international law because all states are sovereign
and equal and nothing can bind a state except by its consent; all states have
engaged in the slave trade and therefore obviously have not agreed to be
bound by a rule that the slave trade is prohibited; therefore, no such rule of
international law ever came into existence, and it could be brought into
existence only by the consent of states as shown by treaty or custom.
The Marshall opinion is a clear example of the fact that the moral good
which can be accomplished by a legal community must necessarily be
limited by the ordering principle of the community. France and the United
States could be in complete agreement that all men are equal, but France
would not accept as an obligation binding on French-owned and operated
ships on the high seas or in foreign waters, any rule that an American judge
sitting in Boston might deduce from the moral equality of man. Nor would
the United States, or any other state be so bound.
In the absence of agreed authoritative legislative and judicial processes
to reduce the general and abstract principle of equality to specific and
!concrete mandates and prohibitions, the scope of a state's obligations
would be too uncertain. If states attempt to impose on other states obliga-
tions to which they have not consented, but which the imposing states
believe to be necessary to the safety or salvation of mankind, the result will
not be greater safety and salvation but loss of that imperfect degree of
community and capacity to achieve limited goals that have been achieved
over the generations on the basis of the ordering principle of territorial
sovereignty.
The realism of Marshall's position is reflected in the Charter of the
United Nations. As I have pointed out above, the purposes of preserving
peace and protecting human rights are stated in Article 1, but the organ-
izing principle in accordance with which the members will act to accom-
plish those purposes is stated in Article 2 to be the sovereign equality of
states. The same realism should be reflected in a limitation on exercise of
the treaty power to specific and concrete obligations.
The need for such a subject-matter limitation on the treaty power can be
illustrated by reference to any number of provisions in the human rights
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treaties. For example, Article ! I of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights provides in part:
"2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through
international cooperation, the measures, including specific programmes, which
are needed:
"(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food
supplies in relation to need."
How would the specific and concrete obligations of the United States be
determined under that provision should we adhere to this treaty? Suppose
that a majority of the members of the General Assembly composed of
food-importing states, passed a resolution stating that the obligation of the
United States under Article 11 was to turn over to them without charge
one-third of its annual production of food grains and meat, and suppose
world opinion were rallied in support of the one-third levy against United
States food production. Would that establish the obligation of the United
States under Article II? Suppose the United States took the position that
it was not obligated under Article 11 to ship food to any country that did
not accept the obligation to cut its population growth by 5 per cent a year?
Would India be obligated to make such a cut as a condition to receiving
food shipments from the United States under Article 11?
Such a situation of self-interested deduction of the obligations of other
states, and maneuver for mass support to impose the deduced obligations,
could not realistically be expected to result in effective international coop-
erative or reciprocal activities to advance human rights. It is clear, how-
ever, that some proponents of the human rights treaties would put the
United States into exactly this situation under the assertion that the United
Nations and its specialized agencies have become the legislature for the
world.
Louis Sohn, in an editorial comment in the American Journal of Inter-
national Law, recently stated: "The Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other unanimously
adopted declarations of the United Nations have established a legislative
framework for the protection of human rights throughout the world." 8
After allowing for the hyperbole of advocacy, this is still an irresponsible
statement. The organizing principle of the United Nations is the sovereign
equality of states. The United Nations facilitates the drafting of treaties,
but no state is bound unless it adheres. Every Security Council debate of a
8 Louis Sohn, United Nations Machinery for Implementing Human Rights, 62 A.J.I.L.
909 (1968).
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really serious threat to world peace, such as the Arab-Israeli hostilities,
demonstrates the frustrating but necessary limitations imposed on the
United Nations by the continuing vitality of the principle of territorial
sovereignty. Every morning's paper brings news of disputes and conflicts
rooted in differences of national interest, history, culture and ideology.
There realities cannot be erased by the earnestness or good intentions of
the advocates of current human-rights treaties.
The realistic way to achieve treaties that will effectively advance human
rights is for states to negotiate out the concrete and specific implications
that are mutually advantageous. With respect to an equitable worldwide
distribution of food, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) has made a start. The basic commodity exporting countries
that have not been receiving enough for their products are negotiating for
better prices and marketing conditions. The specific obligations of export-
ing and importing states can then be set down in treaties which developed
states will be willing to sign and carry out because they will know the
scope of the obligations they incur. An organization of petroleum exporting
countries has recently been formed to negotiate with petroleum importing
countries. If other organizations are formed on the basis of common inter-
ests the general and abstract statements of human rights can be reduced by
negotiation to concrete and specific obligations. The resulting treaties can
realistically be expected to result in cooperative or reciprocal international
activities to advance human rights.
One of the subject-matter limitations on the treaty power, which exists
as to every sovereignty because it reflects the realities of the international
community, is that the subject matter be so sufficiently specific and con-
crete that states can reasonably foresee the scope of the obligations they
will incur by adhering to the treaty.
VI. Summary
The Constitution of the United States grants the power to make treaties
to the national government. This power is limited by express prohibitions
in the Constitution, but not by the powers reserved to the States. The
"matter of international concern" limitation is constitutional in that "treaty
power" is granted by the Constitution, but the scope of the power in any
nation, to make treaties is to be determined by reference to the nature of
the international community and its law. This brings the Charles Evans
Hughes' suggestion that the treaty is limited to external matters within'the
recognized category of limitations defined as "those which exist as to every
sovereignty" by Charles Henry Butler, author of THE TREATY POWER
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OF THE UNITED STA TES, who made the principal speech in response
to which Hughes made his famous remarks on the treaty power.
Because of its decentralized nature, international law achieves a measure
of effectiveness only if it adheres closely to the realities of interstate
activities, expectations and ordering principles. Any subject-matter limita-
tion on the treaty power is to be found in these realities, and the sanction
for breach of such limitations is the sure disaster that will follow from
relying on illusion for protection of national interests. A principle embody-
ing this view might be stated as follows: If expecting cooperative or
reciprocal actions of states, or effective sanctions, is unrealistic, the subject
matter is not appropriate for a treaty.
This principle of realistic expectations was applied to the interactions of
states with respect to some of the important types of national functions.
The way in which a state treats its own nationals within its own territory
has traditionally been an entirely internal matter, because the basic order-
ing principle of international law, territorial sovereignty, distributed author-
ity to protect life and property in accordance with ability to take and hold
territory. However, the way in which a state, within its territory, treats the
nationals of other states has from the beginning been an external matter,
appropriate for treaties, because of the necessity of accepting reciprocal
obligations if a state is to assure protection for its nationals in areas where
it is not permitted to send armed escorts.
The mutual advantage of trade and commerce treaties that enable na-
tionals of one state to do business more profitably within the territory of
other states, and the ready availability of effective sanctions against the
nationals of a breaching state have made-the economic welfare of nationals
abroad an appropriate subject-matter for treaties. Scientific research is an
appropriate subject for treaties because it does not require exclusive con-
trol of large areas of environment, and therefore states can lay aside
territorial claims in the Antarctic, in space, and on heavenly bodies, and
with mutual advantage cooperate in scientific endeavors.
Developed states have recently sought to foster international stability
and peace by providing technical and financial assistance to developing
states. Some of these treaties, particularly as exemplified in the Alliance for
Progress, make the relationships between nationals within the receiving
state with respect to roads, power resources, schools, tax systems, et
cetera, the subject matter of treaties. Because of differences in national
interests, history, culture and ideology, there is little likelihood that
effective international cooperative or reciprocal action will occur with
respect to these matters. Therefore, previously entirely internal economic
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and social matters in developing states have become only marginally ex-
ternal, despite the need for international assistance.
It has been urged that the adherence of developed states, like the United
States, to the human rights treaties is necessary to achieve international
stability and peace, because we cannot expect developing states to respect
basic human rights unless we demonstrate our own commitment to respect
such rights. This would make the political, economic and social relation-
ships between Americans within the United States the subject of inter-
national cooperative or reciprocal actions. The deep and pervasive contin-
uing acceptance of the principle of territorial sovereignty enables devel-
oping states to accept international assistance for internal economic and
social development, and then, by invoking "intervention," vitiate any inter-
national participation in decisions about internal utilization. It is unrealistic
to expect developed states, like the United States and the Soviet Union,
that have greater power and are not in the position of needing economic
assistance to rely any less upon the exclusionary aspect of territorial
sovereignty. Therefore, the previously internal matters of the political,
economic and social rights of nationals of developed states inter se within
their own territories remain entirely internal, and are not appropriate sub-
jects for exercise of the treaty power.
Under the principle of realistic expectations, another subject-matter
limitation on the treaty power is suggested, namely, whether the matter is
sufficiently specific and concrete. Many of the provisions in current human
rights treaties are general and abstract, such as requiring states to "ensure
an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need." Within
states, effectively operating legislative and judicial processes serve author-
itatively to reduce general and abstract statements of rights, such as free-
dom of speech, to specific and concrete obligations of individuals. National
differences of interest, history, culture and ideology have prevented the
establishment of effective legislative and judicial processes in the inter-
national community, and would make unrealistic any expectations that
general and abstract treaty provisions would be effective in advancing
human rights. Each state would deduce from the general and abstract
statements, on the basis of its own perspectives of interest, history, culture
and ideology, the obligations of other states, and then try to whip up
support in world opinion or in bloc action, to impose on others the unilat-
erally deduced obligation. A competition between such self-interested de-
ductions of each other's obligations would not advance 'human rights,
international stability, or peace.
The realistic way to advance human rights is for states which can
possibly gain mutual advantage from cooperative or reciprocal actions to
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negotiate out the specific and concrete obligations involved and embody
them in a treaty. For instance, food-importing and food-exporting states
could negotiate out specific obligations involved in such a general and
abstract goal as equitable distribution of the world food supply in relation
to need. Then mutual advantage, rather than the vague goal of world peace,
would move them to comply.
It is unrealistic to expect effective international cooperative or reciprocal
actions to result from treaty obligations stated in general and abstract
terms. Whether the subject matter is sufficiently specific and concrete
should be accepted as a limitation on the treaty-making power.
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